The Principle of Indifference and Imprecise Probability

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):110-114 (2014)
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Sometimes different partitions of the same space each seem to divide that space into propositions that call for equal epistemic treatment. Famously, equal treatment in the form of equal point-valued credence leads to incoherence. Some have argued that equal treatment in the form of equal interval-valued credence solves the puzzle. This paper shows that, once we rule out intervals with extreme endpoints, this proposal also leads to incoherence

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Susanna Rinard
Harvard University


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