Color Relationalism, Ordinary Illusion, and Color Incompatibility

Philosophia 42 (4):1085-1097 (2014)
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Abstract
Relationalism is a view popularized by Cohen according to which the colors are relational properties. Cohen’s view has the unintuitive consequence that the following propositions are false: (i) no object can be more than one determinate or determinable color all over at the same time; (ii) ordinary illusion cases occur whenever the color perceptually represented conflicts, according to (i) above, with the object’s real color; and (iii) the colors we perceive obey (i). I investigate Cohen’s attempt to address these intuitive propositions with which his view struggles and find it to be incompatible with how he motivates his view.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
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Color Realism and Color Science.Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R.

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2014-08-13

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