Dispensing with experiential acquaintance

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Experiential acquaintance is an alleged relation between ourselves and our experiences that has sometimes been hypothesised as necessary for knowledge of our experiences. This paper begins with a clarification of ‘acquaintance’ and an explanation of ‘experience’ that focuses attention on a famous, but flawed, argument by G. E. Moore. It goes on to critically examine several recent arguments concerning experiential acquaintance and to show how internalist foundationalism can respond to a famous Sellarsian dilemma without appeal to a relation of acquaintance with our experiences. It concludes that we can dispense with experiential acquaintance.

Author's Profile

William Robinson
Iowa State University


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