Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival

In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-32 (2007)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I critically discuss both the particular doctrinal and general meta-philosophical or methodological tenets of Mark Johnston's paper "Human Beings", attending to several weaknesses in his argument. One of the most important amongst them is an apparent reliance on a substitution of identicals within an intensional context as he argues that continuity of functioning brain is essential to the persistence of "Human Beings" as allegedly singled out by his methodology; another equally important is a simple lacuna in place of an argument that candidate entities for re-identification by means we take for granted in the case of persons cannot be what I call "mentalistically" individuated.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ROBHBH
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-01-16

Total views
295 ( #23,513 of 65,651 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #33,192 of 65,651 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.