In defense of Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality about color

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Abstract
Are the following propositions true of the colors: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate color all over at the same time (Incompatibility); the colors of objects are mind-independent (Objectivism); and most human observers usually perceive the colors of objects veridically in typical conditions (Veridicality)? One reason to think not is that the empirical literature appears to support the proposition that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects amongst human observers in typical conditions (P-Disagreement). In this article, we defend Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality by calling into question whether the empirical literature really supports P-Disagreement.
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ROBIDO-4
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 6 (2015-11-21)
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Mind and World.McDowell, John

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2012-10-06

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