A reply to Cling’s “The epistemic regress problem”

Philosophical Studies 159 (2):263-276 (2012)
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Andrew Cling presents a new version of the epistemic regress problem, and argues that intuitionist foundationalism, social contextualism, holistic coherentism, and infinitism fail to solve it. Cling’s discussion is quite instructive, and deserving of careful consideration. But, I argue, Cling’s discussion is not in all respects decisive. I argue that Cling’s dilemma argument against holistic coherentism fails.

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William Roche
Texas Christian University


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