Coherentism, truth, and witness agreement

Acta Analytica 25 (2):243-257 (2010)
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Abstract
Coherentists on epistemic justification claim that all justification is inferential, and that beliefs, when justified, get their justification together (not in isolation) as members of a coherent belief system. Some recent work in formal epistemology shows that “individual credibility” is needed for “witness agreement” to increase the probability of truth and generate a high probability of truth. It can seem that, from this result in formal epistemology, it follows that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive, that it is not the case that, under the requisite conditions, coherentist justification increases the probability of truth and generates a high probability of truth. I argue that this does not follow.
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What is Justified Belief.Goldman, Alvin I.
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Conee, Earl & Feldman, Richard

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