Explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant, or inference to the best explanation meets Bayesian confirmation theory

Analysis 73 (4):659-668 (2013)
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In the world of philosophy of science, the dominant theory of confirmation is Bayesian. In the wider philosophical world, the idea of inference to the best explanation exerts a considerable influence. Here we place the two worlds in collision, using Bayesian confirmation theory to argue that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant

Author Profiles

William Roche
Texas Christian University
Elliott Sober
University of Wisconsin, Madison


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