Explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant, or inference to the best explanation meets Bayesian confirmation theory

Analysis 73 (4):659-668 (2013)
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Abstract
In the world of philosophy of science, the dominant theory of confirmation is Bayesian. In the wider philosophical world, the idea of inference to the best explanation exerts a considerable influence. Here we place the two worlds in collision, using Bayesian confirmation theory to argue that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant
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Archival date: 2017-03-02
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