Explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant, or inference to the best explanation meets Bayesian confirmation theory

Analysis 73 (4):659-668 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In the world of philosophy of science, the dominant theory of confirmation is Bayesian. In the wider philosophical world, the idea of inference to the best explanation exerts a considerable influence. Here we place the two worlds in collision, using Bayesian confirmation theory to argue that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-03-02
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
344 ( #20,203 of 65,603 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #48,161 of 65,603 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.