Knowing What One Believes – In Defense of a Dispositional Reliabilist Extrospective Account

American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):365-379 (2016)
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We seem to enjoy a special kind of access to our beliefs. We seem able to know about them via a distinctively first-personal method, and such knowledge seems epistemically superior to any knowledge that others might attain of our beliefs. This paper defends a novel account of this access. The account is extrospective in that it explains this access in terms of our ability to think about the (non-mental) world. Moreover, it does not require the contentious claim that judging that p suffices for coming to believe that p. This is a significant strength of the account.

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Michael Roche
Idaho State University


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