Knowing What One Believes – In Defense of a Dispositional Reliabilist Extrospective Account

American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):365-379 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
We seem to enjoy a special kind of access to our beliefs. We seem able to know about them via a distinctively first-personal method, and such knowledge seems epistemically superior to any knowledge that others might attain of our beliefs. This paper defends a novel account of this access. The account is extrospective in that it explains this access in terms of our ability to think about the (non-mental) world. Moreover, it does not require the contentious claim that judging that p suffices for coming to believe that p. This is a significant strength of the account.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-11-05
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
191 ( #26,253 of 56,043 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #26,106 of 56,043 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.