Mundos possíveis, propriedades naturais e mereologia

Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I argue in this dissertation that natural properties play a central role in David Lewis' modal realism. To argue in favor of this thesis I present: a bottom-up explanation of a top-down possible world metaphysics; a new definition of natural properties and natural fusion, a new mereological operation. To achieve these aims, in the first chapter, I contextualize the discussion, in the second I resume the discussion about universals in contemporary philosophy and argue that, considering the distinct formulations of the problem, class nominalism combined with modal realism might be the best solution. Furthermore, I discuss Devitt's solution in which he defends that the problem about universals is, in fact, a pseudo problem. In the third chapter, I introduce a minimal ontology of properties, regarding natural properties, I discuss the existing definitions, present a new one and discuss some theories of similarity, a notion that is in the core of the definition I propose. Besides, I present how natural properties benefit the definition of terms of nomological package, linked to its fundamentality role. I also present some applications related to the rationality role that encompass some well-known philosophical problems of the second half of 20th century. In the fourth chapter, I present some varieties of philosophical realism, I consider the theoretical advantages of taking scientific realism as background and I discuss one more utility of natural properties, the solution to the problem of eligibility of reference or, the Putnam's paradox. In the fifth chapter, I discuss how mereology is important to link several aspects of Lewis' modal realism. For such, I discuss the relation between composition as identity and ontological innocence of mereology and I present the natural fusion mereology, a new mereological operation that aims to minimize the problems of unrestricted composition.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ROCMPP-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-06-06
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Models and Reality.Putnam, Hilary
.Garrett, Don (ed.)
Realism.Putnam, Hilary
Modal Realism.Lewis, David

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-12-16

Total views
222 ( #16,164 of 43,936 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
108 ( #4,549 of 43,936 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.