On material and logical implication: clarifying some common little mistakes

Intuitio 6 (2):239-252 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The aim of this paper is to clarify the truth-functional interpretation of the logical connective of the material implication. The importance of such clarification lies in the fact that it allows avoiding the supposed paradoxes introduced by C. I. Lewis (1918). I argue that an adequate understanding of the history and purposes of logic is enough to dissolve them away. The defense is based on an exposition of propositional compositionalism. To compare, I also present Stalnaker’s (1968) alternative that seeks to explain the implicit concept of conditionality of conditionals assertions. In order to reinforce my aim I expound the twelve different meanings of ‘implication’ stated by Corcoran (1993) in order to hold that a proper understanding of these meanings allows us to avoid ambiguities and confusions. Finally, I expect to show that despite the possible alternatives, compositionalism is still the best explanation for the truth-functionality account of logical connectives.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
A Theory of Conditionals.Stalnaker, Robert C.
Begriffsschrift.Frege, Gottlob

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
1,018 ( #2,972 of 50,361 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
239 ( #1,540 of 50,361 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.