On material and logical implication: clarifying some common little mistakes

Intuitio 6 (2):239-252 (2013)
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The aim of this paper is to clarify the truth-functional interpretation of the logical connective of the material implication. The importance of such clarification lies in the fact that it allows avoiding the supposed paradoxes introduced by C. I. Lewis (1918). I argue that an adequate understanding of the history and purposes of logic is enough to dissolve them away. The defense is based on an exposition of propositional compositionalism. To compare, I also present Stalnaker’s (1968) alternative that seeks to explain the implicit concept of conditionality of conditionals assertions. In order to reinforce my aim I expound the twelve different meanings of ‘implication’ stated by Corcoran (1993) in order to hold that a proper understanding of these meanings allows us to avoid ambiguities and confusions. Finally, I expect to show that despite the possible alternatives, compositionalism is still the best explanation for the truth-functionality account of logical connectives.
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