On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence

Erkenntnis 79 (S3):647-665 (2014)
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I argue that coherence is truth-conducive in that coherence implies an increase in the probability of truth. Central to my argument is a certain principle for transitivity in probabilistic support. I then address a question concerning the truth-conduciveness of coherence as it relates to (something else I argue for) the truth-conduciveness of consistency, and consider how the truth-conduciveness of coherence bears on coherentist theories of justification
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Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Bayesian Epistemology.Bovens, Luc & Hartmann, Stephan

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