On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence
Erkenntnis 79 (S3):647-665 (2014)
Abstract
I argue that coherence is truth-conducive in that coherence implies an increase in the probability of truth. Central to my argument is a certain principle for transitivity in probabilistic support. I then address a question concerning the truth-conduciveness of coherence as it relates to (something else I argue for) the truth-conduciveness of consistency, and consider how the truth-conduciveness of coherence bears on coherentist theories of justification
Keywords
Categories
Reprint years
2014
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ROCOTT
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-03-02
View upload history
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge and Lotteries.Hawthorne, John
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.BonJour, Laurence
Warrant and Proper Function.Plantinga, Alvin
View all 176 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Evidential Support, Transitivity, and Screening-Off.Roche, William
Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Kvanvig, Jonathan
The ‘Alice in Wonderland’ Mechanics of the Rejection of (Climate) Science: Simulating Coherence by Conspiracism.Lewandowsky, Stephan; Cook, John & Lloyd, Elisabeth
Six Actionable Canons for Rationality in Strategy Practice.van Straten, Roeland
Added to PP index
2013-10-25
Total views
174 ( #24,029 of 50,376 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #26,753 of 50,376 )
2013-10-25
Total views
174 ( #24,029 of 50,376 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #26,753 of 50,376 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.
