The Synthetic Relation in Hume

The Dialectic of the Universal and the Particular, Ed. By Jonathan Hanen, Institüt Für Die Wissenshaften Vom Menschen; Junior Fellows Conferences, 4:121-165 (1999)
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Abstract

Here we will see that contrary to the party line, Hume’s notion of a relation should be understood, in all cases, as a peculiar non-necessary synthetic relation; unique, but similar in a certain constructive sense to what I characterize as a mathematical notion of synthesis. And, most controversially, I argue that this non-necessary synthetic notion of a relation includes Hume’s arithmetical relations, which have typically been interpreted as either “analytic,” necessary, or both. In this general respect, Hume anticipates Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction.

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Stefanie Rocknak
Hartwick College

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