The Vulgar Conception of Objects in “Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses”

Hume Studies 33 (1):67-90 (2007)
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Abstract

In this paper, we see that contrary to most readings of T 1.4.2 in the Treatise, Hume does not think that objects are sense impressions. This means that Hume’s position on objects is not to be conflated with the vulgar perspective. Moreover, the vulgar perspective undergoes a marked transition in T 1.4.2, evolving from what we may call vulgar perspective I into vulgar perspective II. This paper presents the first detailed analysis of this evolution, which includes an explanation of T 1.4.2’s four-part system.

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Stefanie Rocknak
Hartwick College

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