Kripke y las descripciones rígidas

Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 19 (1):109-113 (1993)
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In this paper I discuss a passage from *Naming and Necessity* where Kripke assumes that the essential properties by means of which a definite description designates are a sufficient condition of its rigidity. I put forward two examples that show the falsity of this assumption. Then I examine the non-rigid character of definite descriptions that designate by means of properties that are sufficient conditions of identity of the objects designated by those descriptions. I conclude that the properties by means of which rigid descriptions designate must be both necessary and sufficient conditions of the identity of the designated objects.
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