Kripke y las descripciones rígidas
Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 19 (1):109-113 (1993)
Abstract
In this paper I discuss a passage from *Naming and Necessity* where Kripke assumes that the essential properties by means of which a definite description designates are a sufficient condition of its rigidity. I put forward two examples that show the falsity of this assumption. Then I examine the non-rigid character of definite descriptions that designate by means of properties that are sufficient conditions of identity of the objects designated by those descriptions. I conclude that the properties by means of which rigid descriptions designate must be both necessary and sufficient conditions of the identity of the designated objects.
Keywords
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
RODKYL
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-11-27
Total views
247 ( #29,618 of 69,147 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #54,208 of 69,147 )
2013-11-27
Total views
247 ( #29,618 of 69,147 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #54,208 of 69,147 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.