Paradigms and Russell's Resemblance Regress

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):644 – 651 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently advocated strategy to stop Russell's regress by using paradigms does not succeed.

Author's Profile

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
503 (#35,457)

6 months
93 (#53,884)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?