Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's regress

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):395 – 408 (2001)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without falling into a vicious infinite regress, and (b) even if resemblance nominalism had to admit a universal of resemblance, this would not make it pointless to avoid postulating other universals.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
RODRNA
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
553 ( #11,239 of 64,083 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #43,877 of 64,083 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.