Reasons to Not Believe (and Reasons to Act)

Episteme 13 (4):439-48 (2016)
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Abstract
In “Reasons to Believe and Reasons to Act,” Stewart Cohen argues that balance of reasons accounts of rational action get the wrong results when applied to doxastic attitudes, and that there are therefore important differences between reasons to believe and reasons to act. In this paper, I argue that balance of reasons accounts of rational action get the right results when applied to the cases that Cohen considers, and that these results highlight interesting similarities between reasons to believe and reasons to act. I also consider an argument for Cohen's conclusion based on the principle that Adler, Moran, Shah, Velleman and others call “transparency.” I resist this argument by explaining why transparency is itself doubtful.
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Archival date: 2019-03-06
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Doxastic Deliberation.Shah, Nishi & David Velleman, J.
Belief's Own Ethics.Adler, Jonathan

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