Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths

Philosophia 39 (3):547-561 (2011)
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That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of responding to this problem for safety, issuing from work by Williamson and Pritchard, are of dubious success
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Counterfactuals.Lewis, David K.
Epistemic Luck.Pritchard, Duncan

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Citations of this work BETA
Modal Security.Clarke‐Doane, Justin & Baras, Dan
Safety and the True–True Problem.Cogburn, Jon & Roland, Jeffrey W.

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