Perceived colors and perceived locations: A problem for color subjectivism

American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):125-138 (2012)
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Color subjectivists claim that, despite appearances to the contrary, the world external to the mind is colorless. However, in giving an account of color perception, subjectivists about the nature of perceived color must address the nature of perceived spatial location as well. The argument here will be that subjectivists’ problems with coordinating the metaphysics of perceived color and perceived location render color perception implausibly mysterious. Consequently, some version of color realism, the view that colors are (physical, dispositional, functional, sui generis, or some other) properties of physical objects, is correct.

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Peter Ross
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona


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