Perceived colors and perceived locations: A problem for color subjectivism

American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):125-138 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Color subjectivists claim that, despite appearances to the contrary, the world external to the mind is colorless. However, in giving an account of color perception, subjectivists about the nature of perceived color must address the nature of perceived spatial location as well. The argument here will be that subjectivists’ problems with coordinating the metaphysics of perceived color and perceived location render color perception implausibly mysterious. Consequently, some version of color realism, the view that colors are (physical, dispositional, functional, sui generis, or some other) properties of physical objects, is correct.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ROSAP
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2011-02-04

Total views
534 ( #3,869 of 37,215 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #12,780 of 37,215 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.