Fitting color into the physical world

Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):575-599 (2010)
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Abstract

I propose a strategy for a metaphysical reduction of perceived color, that is, an identification of perceived color with properties characterizable in non-qualitative terms. According to this strategy, a description of visual experience of color, which incorporates a description of the appearance of color, is a reference-fixing description. This strategy both takes color appearance seriously in its primary epistemic role and avoids rendering color as metaphysically mysterious. I’ll also argue that given this strategy, a plausible account of perceived color claims that colors are physical properties of physical objects.

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Peter Ross
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

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