Knowledge entails dispositional belief

Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50 (2013)
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Knowledge is widely thought to entail belief. But Radford has claimed to offer a counterexample: the case of the unconfident examinee. And Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel have claimed empirical vindication of Radford. We argue, in defense of orthodoxy, that the unconfident examinee does indeed have belief, in the epistemically relevant sense of dispositional belief. We buttress this with empirical results showing that when the dispositional conception of belief is specifically elicited, people’s intuitions then conform with the view that knowledge entails (dispositional) belief

Author Profiles

David Rose
Stanford University
Jonathan Schaffer
Rutgers University - New Brunswick


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