Paradoxicality in Kripke’s theory of truth

Synthese 200 (2):1-23 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


A lot has been written on solutions to the semantic paradoxes, but very little on the topic of general theories of paradoxicality. The reason for this, we believe, is that it is not easy to disentangle a solution to the paradoxes from a specific conception of what those paradoxes consist in. This paper goes some way towards remedying this situation. We first address the question of what one should expect from an account of paradoxicality. We then present one conception of paradoxicality that has been offered in the literature: the fixed-point conception. According to this conception, a statement is paradoxical if it cannot obtain a classical truth-value at any fixed-point model. In order to assess this proposal rigorously we provide a non-metalinguistic characterization of paradoxicality and we evaluate whether the resulting account satisfies a number of reasonable desiderata.

Author Profiles

Camila Gallovich
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
Lucas Rosenblatt
University of Buenos Aires


Added to PP

99 (#55,900)

6 months
64 (#12,894)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?