The Case against Epistemic Relativism: Reflections on Chapter 6 of F ear of Knowledge

Episteme 4 (1):10-29 (2007)
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According to one sort of epistemic relativist, normative epistemic claims (e.g., evidence E justifies hypothesis H) are never true or false simpliciter, but only relative to one or another epistemic system. In chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian objects to this view on the ground that its central notions cannot be explained, and that it cannot account for the normativity of epistemic discourse. This paper explores how the dogged relativist might respond

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Gideon Rosen
Princeton University


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