The case against epistemic relativism: Reflections on chapter 6 of fear of knowledge

Episteme 4 (1):10-29 (2007)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to one sort of epistemic relativist, normative epistemic claims (e.g., evidence E justifies hypothesis H) are never true or false simpliciter, but only relative to one or another epistemic system. In chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian objects to this view on the ground that its central notions cannot be explained, and that it cannot account for the normativity of epistemic discourse. This paper explores how the dogged relativist might respond
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ROSTCA-5
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
577 ( #7,486 of 53,646 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #25,505 of 53,646 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.