Our Intuitions About the Experience Machine

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):110-117 (2017)
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Abstract

This article responds to recent empirical studies by De Brigard and Weijers on intuitions about Nozick's experience machine thought experiment. It argues that, contra De Brigard and Weijers, our intuitions about the experience machine do undermine hedonism about well-being and what's good for us. It furthers this argument by conducting new empirical studies into our intuitions about the experience machine.

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Rach Cosker-Rowland
University of Leeds

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