Scientific progress without increasing verisimilitude: In response to Niiniluoto

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 51:100-104 (2015)
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Abstract

First, I argue that scientific progress is possible in the absence of increasing verisimilitude in science’s theories. Second, I argue that increasing theoretical verisimilitude is not the central, or primary, dimension of scientific progress. Third, I defend my previous argument that unjustified changes in scientific belief may be progressive. Fourth, I illustrate how false beliefs can promote scientific progress in ways that cannot be explicated by appeal to verisimilitude.

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Darrell P. Rowbottom
Lingnan University

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