The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment

Analysis 78 (2):266-275 (2018)
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Many have argued that various features of moral disagreements create problems for cognitivism about moral judgment, but these arguments have been shown to fail. In this paper, I articulate a new problem for cognitivism that derives from features of our responses to moral disagreement. I argue that cognitivism entails that one of the following two claims is false: a mental state is a belief only if it tracks changes in perceived evidence; it is intelligible to make moral judgments that do not track changes in perceived evidence. I explain that there is a good case that holds such that we should prefer theories that do not entail the negation of. And I argue that the seeming intelligibility of entirely intransigent responses to peer disagreement about moral issues shows us that there is a good case that holds.
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Archival date: 2022-06-11
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