The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement

Noûs 51 (4):802-831 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper is about how moral disagreement matters for metaethics. It has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epistemic accessibility requirement. Namely, moral facts must be accessible to some possible agent. In the second part I show that because this accessibility requirement on moral facts holds, there is a route from facts about the moral disagreements of agents in idealized conditions to conclusions about what moral facts there are. In the third part I build on this route to show that (*) if there is significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, then our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and we should accept relativism over non-naturalism and quasi-realism. So, if, like many, you think that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, you should hold that our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and reject non-naturalism and quasi-realism. In the fourth part of this paper I show that (*) undermines the plausibility of non-naturalism, quasi-realism, and the view that our understanding of morality is not fatally flawed even if we do not have sufficient reason to believe that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
2017
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ROWTSO-7
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-08-29
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
.Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.)
Ethical Intuitionism.Huemer, Michael

View all 80 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-08-18

Total views
274 ( #13,106 of 43,739 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #19,867 of 43,739 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.