In Defence of No Best World

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Recent work in the philosophy of religion has resurrected Leibniz’s idea that there is a best possible world, perhaps ours. In particular, Klaas Kraay’s [2010] construction of a theistic multiverse and Nevin Climenhaga’s [2018] argument from infinite value theory are novel defenses of a best possible world. I do not think that there is a best world, and show how both Kraay and Climenhaga may be resisted. First, I argue that Kraay’s construction of a theistic multiverse can be resisted from plausible assumptions about set theory. Next, I argue against the value-theoretic assumptions that underlie Climenhaga’s argument and show how to give an infinite value theory where there is no best world.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
RUBIDO-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-01-27
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-01-27

Total views
150 ( #30,772 of 55,967 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
48 ( #15,990 of 55,967 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.