The Copernican Principle, Intelligent Extraterrestrials, and Arguments from Evil

Religious Studies:1-21 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
The physicist Richard Gott defends the Copernican principle, which claims that when we have no information about our position along a given dimension among a group of observers, we should consider ourselves to be randomly located among those observers in respect to that dimension. First, I apply Copernican reasoning to the distribution of evil in the universe. I then contend that evidence for intelligent extraterrestrial life strengthens four important versions of the argument from evil. I remain neutral regarding whether this result is a reductio of these arguments from evil or the statement of a genuine evidential relationship.
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First archival date: 2017-11-18
Latest version: 2 (2017-11-19)
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Death.Nagel, Thomas
The Problem of Evil.Stump, Eleonore
Must God Create the Best?Adams, Robert Merrihew

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