Representation and mental representation

Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):204-225 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper engages critically with anti-representationalist arguments pressed by prominent enactivists and their allies. The arguments in question are meant to show that the “as-such” and “job-description” problems constitute insurmountable challenges to causal-informational theories of mental content. In response to these challenges, a positive account of what makes a physical or computational structure a mental representation is proposed; the positive account is inspired partly by Dretske’s views about content and partly by the role of mental representations in contemporary cognitive scientific modeling.

Author's Profile

Robert D. Rupert
University of Colorado, Boulder


Added to PP

760 (#16,517)

6 months
221 (#8,724)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?