Possible Worlds and the Objective World

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):389-422 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

David Lewis holds that a single possible world can provide more than one way things could be. But what are possible worlds good for if they come apart from ways things could be? We can make sense of this if we go in for a metaphysical understanding of what the world is. The world does not include everything that is the case—only the genuine facts. Understood this way, Lewis's “cheap haecceitism” amounts to a kind of metaphysical anti-haecceitism: it says there aren't any genuine facts about individuals over and above their qualitative roles.

Author's Profile

Jeffrey Sanford Russell
University of Southern California

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-07-19

Downloads
1,018 (#10,664)

6 months
156 (#15,496)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?