Representing unicorns: how to think about intensionality

In G. Currie, P. Kotatko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics. College Publications (2012)
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Abstract
The paper focuses on two apparent paradoxes arising from our use of intensional verbs: first, their object can be something which does not exist, i.e. something which is nothing; second, the fact that entailment from a qualified to a non-qualified object is not guaranteed. In this paper, I suggest that the problems share a solution, insofar as they arise in connection with intensional verbs that ascribe mental states. The solution turns on (I) a properly intensional or nonrelational notion of representation and (II) a notion of “putting a representation on display”.
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Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.
Truth and Meaning.Davidson, Donald
Reference Without Referents.M. Sainsbury, R. (ed.)

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