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How Not to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference
Journal of Philosophy 76 (12):703-725 (1979)
Abstract
A thorough critique (extracted from the author’s 1979 doctoral dissertation) of Kripke’s purported derivation, in footnote 56 of his philosophical masterpiece /Naming and Necessity/, of nontrivial modal essentialism from the theory of rigid designation.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
660 (#31,568)
6 months
148 (#26,253)
2009-01-28
Downloads
660 (#31,568)
6 months
148 (#26,253)
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