Justificación Y Noción De Verdad

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Abstract
In this article I argue that the notion of truth is so closely linked to the notion of justification that it is not possible to access the truth, even with the best reasons upon which a justification is supported. I’ll show that the notions of truth and reality can only be inferred from our experience of the world, in which our social practices can be verified or disproved, and if our hypotheses are accepted or refuted. I maintain that we can only access realities which we constitute in relation to one of several possible conceptual frameworks. These conceptual frameworks are not transcendental entities nor are they established definitively, they are social constructs. This means that the conceptual frameworks are constituted by the social practices of the subjects. We understand that social practices are institutionalized groups of actions undertaken by members of a community and directed toward the consecution of an end. These actions presuppose that the beliefs, norms and values are shared by members of an epistemic community. Olivé (1999: 135-42). This article begins by presenting Rorty’s counter-proposal for the notion of truth, in relation to which I put forward the principal theses of onto-epistemological pluralism. Subsequently, I develop the idea of inter-subjective contextual justification and I show that this posture, although it does depend on specific conditions for justification, is not arbitrary. I demonstrate the relevance of onto-epistemological pluralism and the need to adequately substantiate our beliefs and decision making, by presenting the case of parents guided by a notion of ´post-truth´ who decide not to vaccinate their children against measles based on insufficiently justified subjective reasons. A fact that is having serious harmful consequences to health, particularly among young children.
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Archival date: 2019-12-27
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2019-12-25

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