The Logic of What Might Have Been

Philosophical Review 98 (1):3-34 (1989)
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Abstract

The dogma that the propositional logic of metaphysical modality is S5 is rebutted. The author exposes fallacies in standard arguments supporting S5, arguing that propositional metaphysical modal logic is weaker even than both S4 and B, and is instead the minimal and weak metaphysical-modal logic T.

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Nathan Salmón
University of California, Santa Barbara

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