The Resilience of Illogical Belief

Noûs 40 (2):369–375 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Although Professor Schiffer and I have many times disagreed, I share his deep and abiding commitment to argument as a primary philosophical tool. Regretting any communication failure that has occurred, I endeavor here to make clearer my earlier reply in “Illogical Belief” to Schiffer’s alleged problem for my version of Millianism.1 I shall be skeletal, however; the interested reader is encouraged to turn to “Illogical Belief” for detail and elaboration. I have argued that to bear a propositional attitude de re is to bear that attitude toward the corresponding singular proposition, no more and no less. If this is right, then according to Millianism every instance of the following modal schema is true

Author's Profile

Nathan Salmón
University of California, Santa Barbara

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
302 (#69,269)

6 months
73 (#75,807)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?