The Unity of Consciousness and the First-Person Perspective

Dissertation, University of Connecticut (2023)
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Abstract

From a felt, introspective perspective, one can identify various kinds of unity amongst all of one’s experiential parts. Most fundamentally, all of the states you are experiencing right now seem to be phenomenally unified, or, felt together. This introspective datum may lead one to believe that where consciousness exists, it always has this structure: there is always a numerically singular subjective perspective on a unified experiential field. In this dissertation, I expose this intuition and subject it to critical scrutiny.

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