Why value values?

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Abstract
Doris argues that an agent is responsible for her behavior only if that behavior expresses (a relevant subset of) the agent’s values. This view has problems explaining responsibility for mistakes or episodes of forgetfulness. These problems highlight a conceptual problem with Doris’s theory of responsible agency and give us reasons to prefer an alternative (non-valuational) theory of responsible agency.
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Archival date: 2017-03-21
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Free Agency.Watson, Gary
Slips.Amaya, Santiago

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2017-03-21

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