A Frege‐Geach Style Objection to Cognitivist Judgment Internalism

Dialectica 68 (3):391-408 (2014)
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Abstract
According to judgment internalism, there is a conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation. This paper offers an argument against that kind of internalism that does not involve counterexamples of the amoralist sort. Instead, it is argued that these forms of judgment internalism fall prey to a Frege-Geach type argument
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Archival date: 2019-10-23
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The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
A Study of Concepts.PEACOCKE, Christopher

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2014-09-27

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