Credence for Epistemic Discourse

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Many recent theories of epistemic discourse exploit an informational notion of consequence, i.e. a notion that defines entailment as preservation of support by an information state. This paper investigates how informational consequence fits with probabilistic reasoning. I raise two problems. First, all informational inferences that are not also classical inferences are, intuitively, probabilistically invalid. Second, all these inferences can be exploited, in a systematic way, to generate triviality results. The informational theorist is left with two options, both of them radical: they can either deny that epistemic modal claims have probability at all, or they can move to a nonstandard probability theory.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-11-04
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
642 ( #11,076 of 71,140 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #37,700 of 71,140 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.