Fictive interaction and the nature of linguistic meaning
In Esther Pascual & Sergeiy Sandler (eds.), The conversation frame: Forms and functions of fictive interaction. John Benjamins (forthcoming)
Abstract
One may distinguish between three broad conceptions of linguistic meaning. One conception, which I will call “logical”, views meaning as given in reference (for words) and truth (for sentences). Another conception, the “monological” one, seeks meaning in the cognitive capacities of the single mind. A third, “dialogical”, conception attributes meaning to interaction between individuals and personal perspectives. In this chapter I directly contrast how well these three approaches deal with the evidence brought forth by fictive interaction. I examine instances of fictive interaction and argue that intersubjectivity in these instances cannot be reduced to either referential-logical or individual-cognitive semantic notions. It follows that intersubjectivity must belong to the essence of linguistic meaning.
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2015-04-11
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272 ( #19,815 of 56,867 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #16,969 of 56,867 )
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