Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This is a reply to Grzankowski's comment on my paper 'To Believe is to Believe True'. I argue that the claim that to believe is to believe true is consistent with the possibility that someone may believe a proposition but not possess the concept of truth. I also argue that to believe P true is not the same as to believe 'P is true'.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-07-11
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
6 ( #41,328 of 40,725 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #38,549 of 40,725 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.