Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability

Ashgate (1997)
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Abstract

This book concentrates on three topics: the problem of the semantic incommensurability of theories; the non-algorithmic character of rational scientific theory choice and naturalised accounts of the rationality of methodological change. The underlying aim is to show how the phenomenon of extensive conceptual and methodological variation in science need not give rise to a thorough-going epistemic or conceptual relativism.

Author's Profile

Howard Sankey
University of Melbourne

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