Two Kinds of Logical Impossibility

Noûs (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In this paper, we argue that a distinction ought to be drawn between two ways in which a given world might be logically impossible. First, a world w might be impossible because the laws that hold at w are different from those that hold at some other world (say the actual world). Second, a world w might be impossible because the laws of logic that hold in some world (say the actual world) are violated at w. We develop a novel way of modelling logical possibility that makes room for both kinds of logical impossibility. Doing so has interesting implications for the relationship between logical possibility and other kinds of possibility (for example, metaphysical possibility) and implications for the necessity or contingency of the laws of logic.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-03-01
Latest version: 3 (2019-03-27)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Logical Pluralism.Beall, Jc & Restall, Greg

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
141 ( #18,258 of 38,962 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
141 ( #2,450 of 38,962 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.