Virtudes Intelectuais e Justificação: duas teorias sobre o caráter cognitivo dos agentes epistêmicos

Dissertation, (2013)
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Abstract
This work has as its main purpose to discuss the use of the concept of virtue in contemporary theories of justification. From a general approximation that recent epistemology has established with traditional moral theories, we intend to evaluate the normative potential that the notion of intellectual virtue can offer to handle key epistemic demands, as the demand for an adequate characterization of the justificational element within the traditional definition of knowledge. Hence, we need to explore some of the theories that, in contemporary philosophy, intended to characterize more properly the element that converts true beliefs into knowledge, based on the idea that it can be derived from the cognitive nature of the subject that forms beliefs. One of the main approaches in this regard was Ernest Sosa's virtue perspectivism. Sosa was responsible for inserting the concept of intellectual virtues in the most recent epistemological debate. His theory is also responsible for the popularization of an epistemic evaluation focused on the character of the doxastic agent. Two other prominent theories in this framework, and which were directly influenced by Sosa's seminal work, are Linda Zagzebski's pure virtue theory and John Greco's agent reliabilism. Both authors followed intuitions present in Sosa's proposal to construct, each in its own way, theories of epistemic justification that takes as evaluative measure the contribution of the subject to convert their beliefs into instances of knowledge. We'll discuss here each of these theories and assess to what degree they can characterize the justification so as to meet some epistemic needs, that we frequently judge important.
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