Contrastive Self-knowledge

Social Epistemology 28 (2):139-152 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In this paper, I draw on a recent account of perceptual knowledge according to which knowledge is contrastive. I extend the contrastive account of perceptual knowledge to yield a contrastive account of self-knowledge. Along the way, I develop a contrastive account of the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, regrets and so on) and suggest that a contrastive account of the propositional attitudes implies an anti-individualist account of propositional attitude concepts (the concepts of belief, desire, regret, and so on)
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-02-27
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Scientific Image.Friedman, Michael
The Scientific Image.Demopoulos, William & van Fraassen, Bas C.
Contrastive Causation.Schaffer, Jonathan

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
105 ( #32,496 of 50,290 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #33,728 of 50,290 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.