A Framework for Grounding the Moral Status of Intelligent Machines

AIES '18, February 2–3, 2018, New Orleans, LA, USA (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I propose a framework, derived from moral theory, for assessing the moral status of intelligent machines. Using this framework, I claim that some current and foreseeable intelligent machines have approximately as much moral status as plants, trees, and other environmental entities. This claim raises the question: what obligations could a moral agent (e.g., a normal adult human) have toward an intelligent machine? I propose that the threshold for any moral obligation should be the "functional morality" of Wallach and Allen [20], while the upper limit of our obligations should not exceed the upper limit of our obligations toward plants, trees, and other environmental entities.
Keywords
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SCHAFF-6
Upload history
First archival date: 2021-04-04
Latest version: 2 (2021-04-04)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-04-04

Total views
12 ( #58,885 of 58,295 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #45,132 of 58,295 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.