A Judgmental Reconstruction of some of Professor Woleński’s logical and philosophical writings

Studia Humana 9 (3):72-103 (2020)
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Roman Suszko said that “Obviously, any multiplication of logical values is a mad idea and, in fact, Łukasiewicz did not actualize it.” The aim of the present paper is to qualify this ‘obvious’ statement through a number of logical and philosophical writings by Professor Jan Woleński, all focusing on the nature of truth-values and their multiple uses in philosophy. It results in a reconstruction of such an abstract object, doing justice to what Suszko held a ‘mad’ project within a generalized logic of judgments. Four main issues raised by Woleński will be considered to test the insightfulness of such generalized truth-values, namely: the principle of bivalence, the logic of scepticism, the coherence theory of truth, and nothingness.
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Archival date: 2020-10-30
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