Coherence and Confirmation through Causation

Mind 122 (485):135-170 (2013)
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Abstract
Coherentism maintains that coherent beliefs are more likely to be true than incoherent beliefs, and that coherent evidence provides more confirmation of a hypothesis when the evidence is made coherent by the explanation provided by that hypothesis. Although probabilistic models of credence ought to be well-suited to justifying such claims, negative results from Bayesian epistemology have suggested otherwise. In this essay we argue that the connection between coherence and confirmation should be understood as a relation mediated by the causal relationships among the evidence and a hypothesis, and we offer a framework for doing so by fitting together probabilistic models of coherence, confirmation, and causation. We show that the causal structure among the evidence and hypothesis is sometimes enough to determine whether the coherence of the evidence boosts confirmation of the hypothesis, makes no difference to it, or even reduces it. We also show that, ceteris paribus, it is not the coherence of the evidence that boosts confirmation, but rather the ratio of the coherence of the evidence to the coherence of the evidence conditional on a hypothesis
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SCHCAC-13
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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References found in this work BETA
Bayesian Epistemology.Bovens, Luc & Hartmann, Stephan
Causation, Prediction, and Search.Spirtes, Peter; Glymour, Clark & Scheines, Richard
Bayes or Bust.Earman, John

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Citations of this work BETA
Demystifying Dilation.Pedersen, Arthur Paul & Wheeler, Gregory
Epistemology of Causal Inference in Pharmacology.Landes, J├╝rgen; Osimani, Barbara & Poellinger, Roland

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2011-10-24

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